To be comparable means that none of the differences (if any) between the situations being compared could materially affect the condition being examined in the methodology (e.g. price or margin), or that reasonably accurate adjustments can be made to eliminate the effect of any such differences. available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/12/45763692.pdf 3 The United Kingdom closely follows the OECD. The U.K.'s transfer pricing rules are found in Schedule 28AA of the Income and Corporate Tax Act, 1988. Paragraph 2 indicates that Sch. 28AA is to be construed in a manner consistent with: the expression of the arm's length principle in Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations. As a result, where transfer pricing rule interpretations conflict or appear ambiguous, the statute itself states that the OECD materials take precedence to resolve them. 4 Canadian transfer pricing rules are found in the INCOME TAX ACT, R.S.C. 1985, §247 (Can. Conceptually, the arm's length principle requires a calculation of the taxable income that might reasonably be expected if the parties were dealing at arm's length with one another. It does this by contrasting the choices made and the outcomes achieved by the taxpayer with those that would have resulted from the interaction of the forces of supply and demand in a comparable open market, or from negotiating among comparable independent parties in more complex settings. In effect, this uses the open market results or the behavior of the independent parties dealing at arm's length with each other as a benchmark.
The concept of comparability is therefore central to the application of the arm's length principle. 6 United States, Treas. Reg. §1.482-1(b)(1) (emphasis added)
In determining the true taxable income of a controlled taxpayer, the standard to be applied in every case is that of a taxpayer dealing at arm's length with an uncontrolled taxpayer. A controlled transaction meets the arm's length standard if the results of the transaction are consistent with the results that would have been realized if uncontrolled taxpayers had engaged in the same transaction under the same circumstances (arm's length result). However, because identical transactions can rarely be located, whether a transaction produces an arm's length result generally will be determined by reference to the results of comparable transactions under comparable circumstances.
important the comparability analysis is. Performing this analysis and proving comparability, however, is a demanding exercise.
What makes the proving comparability so difficult is that the analysis is two sided. Both controlled and uncontrolled transactions must be thoroughly analyzed. Just as much effort needs to be applied to determine the functions, contract terms, risks and the economic conditions for the unrelated party comparables as is spent on analyzing the related parties (taxpayers).
But there is more to this equation. On the "comparables side", there are not one but two steps. First a comparables search is needed. Then the search result differences must be carefully scrutinized and adjust for differences if they are material. 7 As the OECD's Guidelines (2010) indicate:
By definition, a comparison implies examining two terms: the controlled transaction under review and the uncontrolled transactions that are regarded as potentially comparable. The search for comparables is only part of the comparability analysis. It should be neither confused with nor separated from the comparability analysis. The search for information on potentially comparable uncontrolled transactions and the process of identifying comparables is dependent upon prior analysis of the taxpayer's controlled transaction and of the relevant comparability factors (see paragraphs 1.38-1.63).
8
Case law has always demanded this balanced or dual comparability analysis. While this requirement has been implicit in the Internal Revenue Service regulations, it recently it has become more explicit. The 2010 revisions to the OECD Guidelines contain similar language reflecting this change.
The OECD has become critical of database dumps, extensive automated financial database searches for potential comparables that are then dumped on (or presented to) tax authorities as-they-are. This is problematic because the search is being offered as a substitute for meaningful analysis. There is also anecdotal evidence that this data dumping has become a common practice. 9 7 Adjustments are normally made to the unrelated (independent or referent) parties rather than related parties. Under OECD rules making related party adjustments implicates OECD Model Treaty Article 9(1). Doing so means the transfer pricing analysis is not performed on the real transactions but rather on hypothetical ones. See also: Treas. Reg. §1.482-1(d)(2) which states the same general rule. This is different from isolating (separating) a transaction from a related parties' other transactions. Separation is appropriate, provided this process does not remove from consideration elements that have a material effect on prices. In such case, aggregating transactions is required. See: infra note 112 and related text. This was a problem in the Roche Products Pty. Ltd v. Commissioner (Australia) and the GlaxoSmithKline v. The Queen cases considered herein. 8 OECD Guidelines (2010) supra note 2, at ¶3.1 (emphasis added). 9 For example, Dr. Deloris Wright, an economist and frequent expert witness in transfer pricing cases observes:
Many of the [CPM] studies that cross the author's desk take a "database dump" approach to the selection of comparables. In these cases, no reasonable person could argue that the companies selected are comparable to the tested party, unless the sole search criterion is Some jurisdictions, like New Zealand, have challenged this practice 10 while other jurisdictions, like the US, appear more accepting. Thus, what may pass for comparability in the US may not be acceptable in N.Z. or other jurisdictions. This creates difficulties for firms relying on the same transfer pricing study for both US and foreign filings.
The database dump itself, no matter how well the screens or how carefully crafted the filters, never provides solid proof that comparables have been found. At best, the screens and filters provide rough-hewn results. Solid proof requires an entity level analysis that:
(a) Identifies differences between the controlled and uncontrolled parties (b) Assesses the materiality for each difference and if the differences are material, then (c) Specifies the adjustments needed to bring the uncontrolled parties into alignment with the controlled parties Case law requires this process because Judges demand proof as to comparability. The place where jurisdictions differ is in how they answer the next question: What happens when adjustment are not or cannot be made after material differences have been identified? If one jurisdiction accepts search results as comparable (albeit with reduced reliability) 11 while another rejects them as incomparable 12 , then it becomes important for an enterprise to further support its pricing study with a profit split. The only workable method that does not require comparables is a profit split and this is where an audit will likely go if all proposed comparables are rejected.
that the comparable companies operate a business. Proper selection of comparables is a time-consuming, difficult challenge, but a necessary one, if the results are to be useful in planning, audit defense, or/and APA negotiation. Often, the database dump approach also results in a transfer pricing range from negative infinity to positive infinity. Even when this is narrowed to the inter-quartile range, it is virtually meaningless and does not assist the lawyers and accountants who must use the information. Deloris R. 
18
(1) DuPont (1978) DuPont is both an early and an unusual database dump case. The comprehensive financial database searches in DuPont pre-date modern search engines and digitized financial databases. The DuPont search was a time consuming manual search. In addition, DuPont is probably the only case where a one party's search (the IRS) results in the other party's dump (DuPont).
Background
DuPont was the world's largest chemical company when the case arose. The Company was seeing a decrease in US sales and a significant increase in both volume and margins on exports. As a result, the European Common Market 19 presented both an opportunity for greater sales and margins and a threat that DuPont might be locked out.
20
DuPont decided to establish Swiss based subsidiary operations that would be both integral to the US company and complement its existing independent distributor network. Therefore, this Swiss subsidiary was to be more than a mere sales entity. DuPont's success had always been its technical sales service and its indirect sales support. These services and wholesaling product was what the newly formed Swiss subsidiary would provide in Europe. 21 DuPont intentionally located its subsidiary in a low tax jurisdiction. 22 The long term plan was to use low taxed profits generated in Switzerland, sheltered from US income tax, to finance its European expansion. 23 As a result, DuPont de Nemours International S. A. (DISA) was established in 1959 and intercompany pricing was set to split US and Swiss profits on a 25:75 ratio. 24 In addition, the pricing formula guaranteed the Swiss company profits so that it would never incur losses on any transaction. 25 
DuPont's Deficiency
In the statutory notice, the IRS determined deficiencies for tax years 1959 and 1960. In the notice DISA was treated as a distributor and applied a modified resale price method 26 , even though the results were calculated differently in 1959 27 and 1960. 28 When trial started, the IRS had also completed additional audits through 1967. Similar adjustments were proposed for those years and the same calculation method applied as in the 1960 determination.
29
DuPont's Pricing Defense DuPont relied on three experts to defend the pricing used on its return 30 . Each expert attributing 50 percent of net profits on sales flowing through DISA as appropriate based on DISA's marketing function's efforts.
Under cross-examination, however, all three DuPont experts admitted that their opinions assumed that DISA took on normal entrepreneurial risks. Each expert was then made aware that DuPont guaranteed that DISA would be (a) shielded from operational risk of loss and (b) protected from contract termination risk. Each expert then revised his opinion and their net profit allocation estimates fell from 50 percent to 10 -20 percent.
The trial judge subsequently rejected each DuPont experts' opinion because they provided no analysis as to how they adjusted for this material difference in risk, despite their agreement that the difference in risk was material. It had a definite and significant effect on price. 31 24 Id., at *13. 25 Id., at *13. 26 The Court recognizes this as a "fourth method" DuPont, 608 F.2d 445, 456, n. 28. 27 The margin in 1959 is based on a discount to DISA on its purchases from DuPont.
The discount resulted from the application to DISA of ratios of DuPont's total selling expenses (exclusive of advertising) and total administrative expenses to DuPont's total sales on a departmental basis. exist to establish similarity of products (with associated marketing costs), comparability of functions, or parallel geographic (and economic) market conditions.
42
Without performing a comparability analysis on the IRS search results, DuPont's presentation to the Court was a classic database dump. This dump occurred before modern technology existed where on-line databases could use powerful engines to search and filter significant data in just a few moments. Despite this limitation, the results were the same as they would be today. The courts rejected database dumps masquerading as comparables.
In addition, the US Treasury Regulations in place at the time compelled rejection. Adjustments were mandated, rather than optional 43 , whenever material differences between controlled and uncontrolled parties have a definite and reasonably ascertainable effect on price. DuPont made no adjustments for operating expenses or risks. The need for adjustment was very clear with respect to risk. As the trial court noted:
Evidence offered by plaintiff's own experts in this case specifically identified exposure to such entrepreneurial risks as the risk of operating loss as a circumstance that has a definite and reasonably ascertainable effect on price. Findings 102, & 103.
It is not suggested and it does not appear that any of the 32 entities evaluated by Dr. Berry bore any less than all of the risks of loss or failure normally associated with the conduct of an independent, profit-making enterprise. By virtue of its pricing and other arrangements with plaintiff, DISA was not subject to those risks. Findings 78-80, 82, & 84.
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DuPont was decided on the presumptive correctness in the statutory notice. 45 The taxpayer could not prevail with its resale price method because the potential comparables identified in the IRS database search differed materially from the controlled parties. The differences affected price, adjustments were required, and no adjustments were made.
(2) Seagate (1994) Seagate presents a classic fact pattern where the comparable uncontrolled price (CUP) studies 46 should have been used to resolve the transfer pricing questions. Here, 42 Id., at 451. 43 Treas. Reg. §1.482-2(e)(3)(ix) (1968) (available among other places as an appendix in DuPont, 608 F.2d 445, 460) (emphasis added).
In determining an arm's length price appropriate adjustment must be made to reflect any material differences between the uncontrolled purchases and resales used as the basis for the calculation of the appropriate markup percentage and the resales of property involved in the controlled sale. The differences referred to in this subdivision are those differences in functions or circumstances which have a definite and reasonably ascertainable effect on price. 44 both the government and taxpayer representatives sought "simpler" solutions for reasons having to do with adequate taxpayer records and difficulties in reconstructing records after the fact. Unfortunately, however, these solutions did not work. On most issues, the court was left with a record where its decision was based on its "best estimate." 47 The IRS used a database search in part of its case. 48 The search was designed to find a gross margin that would determine an arms length price under a resale price method for completed disk drives Seagate Singapore sold to Seagate Scotts Valley. The IRS's method was rejected because it only offered the court a database search. It did not prove that the search results had uncovered comparable companies. The court believed that numerous adjustments were needed to arrive at what were considered comparables. The IRS did not make them and the court did not have the record to make them on its own.
Background
Seagate Scotts Valley was a leading US computer hard disk drives and component parts manufacturer. Seagate sold 15 disk drive models to a wide ranging OEMs and distributors.
Prior to establishing Seagate Singapore, all disk drive manufacturing occurred in California. On July 30, 1982 a wholly owned subsidiary was established in Singapore to manufacturing high volume, low-end commodity disk drives. Market prices were falling rapidly and market competition was intense. Seagate was searching for a way to further reduce costs by utilizing a 10-year tax holiday in Singapore. Initially, Seagate set intercompany prices at the standard cost to manufacture in the US. Transfer prices were later set at the standard cost to manufacture in Singapore plus a 25% markup. 49 Third party sales of disk drives were substantial in frequency and volume. Seagate Singapore sold the same disk drives models to Seagate Scotts Valley that it sold to third party customers. It would appear reasonable to conclude that the comparable uncontrolled price method should be appropriate for the instant case. The record, however, does not establish whether the circumstances surrounding any of the third party transactions were sufficiently similar to the circumstances involved in the controlled sales. 47 Id., at 195 and 230. 48 There are nine separate transfer pricing issues in Seagate. Only the IRS argument involving intercompany sales for completed disk drives involves a database search. 49 Id., at 196.
Seagate's Deficiencies
In the statutory notice, the price for completed disk drives 50 Seagate Singapore sold to Seagate Scotts Valley were set at a 20% discount from Seagate Scotts Valley's resale price to independent parties. 51 The IRS had significant difficulty supporting this adjustment in their statutory notice. Given how the taxpayer's accounting records were kept, it was not possible for auditors to isolate the costs for Singapore manufactured drives sold to Seagate Scotts Valley from identical US manufactured ones sold directly into the market 52 . As a result rather than being able to cleanly determine the deficiency for completed disk drives, the IRS "backed into" it by aggregating this adjustment with a related adjustment for marketing services. 53 In the statutory notice, the "marketing services" adjustment was set at 20% of Seagate Singapore's "total adjusted sales".
54
Seagate's pricing defense Two expert witnesses defended Seagate's completed disk drive pricing. Dr. Gary E. Holdren prepared a CUP based pricing study in which he compared the prices and sale terms by disk drive model for disk drives Seagate Singapore sold to unrelated third parties and those sold to Seagate Scotts Valley 55 .
The court rejected Dr. Holdren's study because he did "… not establish that the circumstances involved in the uncontrolled sales are identical to the circumstances involved in the controlled sales." 56 Adjustments were needed but not made for differences in sales volume, market size and competitive landscape, geographic market, and timing for sales. 57 In addition, weighted average rather than actual sales prices were used in the analysis. 58 50 All totaled, there were nine transfer pricing issues in this case. 51 Id., at 201 (the component parts adjustment was determined to be the cost of manufacture (in Singapore) plus 15%). Id., at 176. 52 Disk drives are commodity products. Disk drives manufactured at Seagate Scotts Valley are indistinguishable from the same disk drive model manufactured at Seagate Singapore. Internal records did not track manufacturing origin for disk drives. It was not possible to follow a specific Singapore manufactured disk drive sold from Singapore to Scotts Valley then on to an identified third party. 53 A marketing services adjustment was due because Seagate Scotts Valley provided marketing services for all Seagate disk drives. Seagate Scotts Valley facilitated Seagate Singapore's substantial direct third party sales. These direct sales frequently exceeded 50% of all Seagate Singapore sales. Id., at 202. 54 Total adjusted sales included: (a) Singapore sales to third parties, (b) amounts Singapore actually received from intercompany disk drive sales, and (c) a price adjustment applied to the figure at (b). Id., at 203. 55 Id., at 203 -213. 56 Id., at 229. 57 Id., at 229 (in a falling, highly competitive commodity market the circumstances of the sale greatly determine the price, and neither a transaction at a specific point in time, nor an average of all transactions will provide comparability). 58 A second expert, Dr. Daniel P. Broadhurst, used average costs and prices from Dr. Holdren's report to support Seagate's pricing under a resale price method. 59 Once again, the court rejected this conclusion. Because Broadhurst based his report on Holdren's data, it now suffered from Holdren's failings. That is, no required adjustments were made for material differences and average rather than actual sales prices were used. 60 
The IRS's Argument -RSP with a Database Dump
The IRS used a resale price method and two expert witnesses Dr. Grant M. Clowery and Dr. Daniel J. Frisch to support the proposed deficiency.
Dr. Clowery performed an accounting analysis for Seagate Scotts Valley that sets out the gross profit earned on complete disk drive sales. 61 The key calculation involved determining the cost of sales. Gross profit is segmented between disk drives Seagate Scotts Valley manufactured and those Seagate Singapore manufactured. 62 Direct and indirect costs 63 were allocated based on relative sales values 64 .
The second expert, Dr. Daniel J. Frisch, looked at just the complete disk drive distribution function at Seagate Scotts Valley. This is an operation that includes both disk drives manufactured in Scotts Valley and those manufactured in Singapore. Frisch's report compared Dr. Clowery's calculated gross profit margin for Seagate Scotts Valley with gross profit margins for ten independent distributors he deems to be comparable.
Database search
Because, "Dr. Frisch could not locate any independent distributor that performed precisely the same functions under the same circumstances as Seagate Scotts Valley, …" 65 he searched for comparable companies in databases and hoped to extract from the search an analytically sound gross margin that could be used in a resale price calculation.
Dr. Frisch concluded that, taken as a whole, for the fiscal years ended 1984 through 1987, Seagate Scotts Valley earned a negative gross profit margin from reselling the Seagate Singapore-produced disk drives. In contrast, the 10 companies experienced average gross profit margins ranging between 10 and 25 percent of sales over the same 4-year period. Consequently, Dr. Frisch concluded that Seagate Singapore's transfer 59 Id., at 213 -217. 60 Id., at 239. 61 Seagate did not segregate income on its balance sheets in a manner that easily allowed completed disk drive sales to be segmented from other income streams (notable component sales). 62 Id., at 217 (Clowery used Seagate Scotts Valley's monthly cost of sales journals that distinguished various costs incurred locally from "Singapore materials" costs). 63 The indirect costs of sales were Seagate Scotts Valley costs incurred attributable to disk drives sold that were manufactured at both the Scotts Valley and at the Singapore facility. Dr. Frisch's database search was more high-tech than the IRS's search conducted in DuPont. It had more digital filters but that did not make it any more analytical. Dr. Frisch searched under the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 5045 (computers and computer peripheral equipment and software wholesalers) and 5065 (electronic parts and equipment wholesalers). Within this group 67 he applied the following filters to select companies that:
(a) should be a significant disk drive distributor (b) does not engage in manufacturing as a significant activity (c) engages in no (or a trivial amount of) retail level activity (d) was an going concern during Seagate's fiscal years 1984 through 1987 (e) neither started up nor ceased operations during those years that (f) issued public SEC statements with financial data for at least part of this period Dr. Frisch's search identified ten potential comparables. He admitted to the court that there were at least seven significant differences between this group and Seagate Scotts Valley. He deemed only two differences, inventory levels and accounts receivable, to be material and made adjustments for them. The court, however, was not convinced and pointed to search assumptions that covered over fundamental differences it felt even a casual analysis would notice.
Assumption -Clowery's accounting matched that of the comparables
Central to Dr. Frisch's report is the assumption that gross margin percentages Dr. Clowery calculated for Seagate Scotts Valley were the same as or used the same accounting rules as gross margin calculations made for the ten potential comparables. The court notes that Dr. Frisch assumes: (1) that the Form 10-K SEC reports conform to Dr. Clowery's calculations for Seagate Scotts Valley; (2) that all ten firms follow a full absorption costing method for determining cost of goods sold including inventoriable and non-inventoriable expenses in cost of goods sold; and (3) that the ten potential comparables allocate to cost of goods sold the same costs that Dr. Clowery allocates when he determined cost of goods sold for Seagate Scotts Valley.
Assumption -Distribution Can be Segmented from Manufacturing
More damaging still is the problem that both Drs. Clowery and Frisch have with segmenting the distribution and manufacturing functions within Seagate Scotts Valley. Dr. Frisch conceded that:
… if the costs of sales Dr. Clowery allocated to the Seagate Singaporeproduced disk drives includes an extensive amount of manufacturing 66 Id., at 224. 67 The court notes that the group was "… generally The Westreco business plan is based mostly on providing contract research services for its foreign parent Nestec. Minimal technical services were, however, provided to ultimate parent company Nestlé Foods Corp., Inc. In this case, only the Westreco / Nestec service agreement was under scrutiny. 71 The question is simple. What is the appropriate fee for the services Westreco provided to Nestec? Background Nestlé, S.A. is a publicly owned Swiss company engaged in worldwide research, development, manufacturing, and marketing for processed food products. R&D is critical to its success, and Nestec is Nestlé's dedicated R&D subsidiary.
Nestec operated through six divisions and seventeen technological development centers located in more than ten countries, most using the suffix "reco" in their name to 68 Id., at 236. 69 Id., at 236. 70 Westreco, T.C. Memo 1992-561 71 Because there are two lines of service and the IRS decides to only adjust the major line (services to Nestec) some unnecessary complexity is brought into the case. The Westreco/Nestec services need to be segmented from the Westreco / Nestle Foods Corp. services. Although the statutory notice is drafted as if this segmentation has been performed, neither the salary multiplier method the audit team used nor the analysis the IRS experts performed at trial make this distinction. denote themselves as a "research company."
72 Westreco, Inc. is Nestec's U.S. subsidiary engaged in contract research at Nestec's direction.
Westreco had two facilities: (1) a pilot plant and laboratory in Marysville, Ohio that focused on research issues related to instant coffee and instant tea, and (2) a technology facility in Milford, Connecticut engaged in technological development and provided technology assistance to related parties 73 . Westreco's fee for services was determined on a sliding scale cost-plus basis:
Nestec compensated petitioner for its R and D services on a cost-plus basis. Nestec was contractually obligated to reimburse petitioner for certain expenses plus a profit equal to 7.5 percent on the first $350,000 of such expenses, 5 percent on the next $1,500,000 of expenses, and 3.5 percent of petitioner's expenses there-after. The reimbursable expenses included all salaries, rent, consulting fees, raw materials, equipment, and administrative expenses, but not taxes. The contract could be terminated by either party on a year-by-year basis, subject to 3 months' written notice.
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Westreco's deficiency The IRS determined deficiencies for 1978 through 1982 based on a "salary multiplier", a measure commonly used to determine compensation in large construction and engineering firms. 75 This unconventional method was shown to be defective 76 and was therefore not relied upon at trial.
Westreco's CUP pricing defense
Westreco's expert, Dr. Clark Chandler, compared Westreco to four companies that each provided contract research and engineering consulting services as their core business function. 77 We are not told about the search process other than it identified these four firms. The search probably was conducted through an online database search. One is left with the impression that we are not told much about the search itself because the search is not what is important. What we are told about in considerable detail is how Chandler sets out his proof that these companies are comparable to Westreco.
The Treasury regulations identify five comparability factors: functions, risks, contractual terms, economic conditions, and property or service 78 . The OECD Guidelines 72 Id., at *1. 73 Id., at *2. 74 Id., at *9. 75 Id., at *11. 76 Not only was Westreco not functionally comparable to a traditional engineering firm (Id., at *18), but if the multiplier is used against a correct wage base for hours actually billed (without administrative costs, fringe benefits, sick leave, vacation, holiday and incentive pay), then the salary multiplier method indicates that Westreco was over-paid rather than underpaid. (Id., at *17). In addition, the statutory notice used an un-segmented base that included the salaries for researchers working on Nestle Foods projects, even though the adjustment was made only on the fees for Nestec projects (Id., at *17 Rigorous analysis is needed whenever a comparability factor or circumstances involving a controlled transaction may affect the arm's length result under a transfer pricing method 80 . Three comparability factors are critical for Dr. Chandler who analyses (1) business relations with clients, (2) financial comparability, and (3) economic and business risks (client, general business, research, and downstream market risks). 81 In each category, Dr. Chandler contrasts Westreco with all four firms selected and explains why Westreco is comfortably positioned within this group 82 .
After Dr. Chandler is convinced that Westreco "fits" in this group, he confirms his assessment with four financial ratios: (1) operating income as a percent of net sales; (2) operating income as a percent of operating assets; (3) pretax income as a percent of net sales; and (4) pretax income as a percent of total assets. 83 Once again Westreco "fits" in this group and Dr. Chandler concluded:
…from the data analyzed, that Westreco's profits were likely to be somewhat lower than those of the four comparable corporations because two of them (Artisan and Gulf) developed commercially viable technology on their own account and owned the rights to that technology. Westreco's profits were relatively more consistent from year to year than other comparables because it faced lower risks. The comparable corporations would be expected to realize higher average profits to compensate for their higher risks. Accordingly, Dr. Chandler opined that the fees received by petitioner from Nestec were comparable to such income from services performed for unrelated corporations.
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IRS's Cost-Plus Argument -a Database Dump
The IRS abandons its salary multiplier argument at trial and uses Dr. Dennis Carlton and Dr. Richard Leftwich as expert witnesses to support a cost-plus methodology. A database dump used to determine the "plus".
Drs. Carlton and Leftwich consulted the Standard & Poor's Computstat Services, Inc. database for publicly traded companies, indexed according to SIC codes. While SIC code number 8711 (engineering services) and 8731 (commercial physical and biological research) were selected, Drs. Carlton and Leftwich did not filter the resulting SIC code 79 The OCED Guidelines consider functions and risks together, listing business strategies as a fifth factor. Under US regulations, business and market share strategies are a "special circumstance." Thus the five factors are not set down identically but for all practical purposed they are the same. Treas. Reg. §1.481-1(d)(1) and OECD Guidelines (2010) ¶1.36; (1995) ¶1.17. 80 Treas. Reg. §1.481-1(d) and OECD Guidelines (2010) ¶1.33; (1995) ¶1.15. 81 The two other factors (functions and property or service) are handled in the general description of the companies Chandler selects. 82 Id., at *19. 83 Id., at *20. 84 Id., at *20. data. The experts' testimony under cross-examination showed their failure to take into account certain attributes for these comparables including:
(a) merging during the relevant years i. operating the same or similar line of business ii. facing unique risk iii. owning particular intangible assets iv. owning particular assets (b) relevant trade level i. exact functions performed (c) individual customers i. involvement in technological development
The court concludes that "the most important fallacy in the report of Drs. Carlton and Leftwich is the lack of comparability between the petitioner and the 15 enumerated corporations." 85 The court was particularly concerned about the proposed comparables' patent and trademark ownership, high number of government contractors, Westreco's guaranteed profitability, and using Compustat data before interest and taxes. Westreco's profitability, on the other hand, was considered after these amounts were deducted.
The IRS's cost-plus approach was based entirely on a database dump. No comparability analysis was performed and the court rejected the IRS's cost-plus results.
Drs. Carlton and Leftwich did nothing to ensure that the functions of the corporations in reality approximated petitioner's business operations. Dr. Carlton, at trial, emphatically stated that comparability is assured when relying solely upon SIC codes because the codes "naturally group firms that do similar things together." Commissioner (Australia), 87 was a dispute about a deficiency derived entirely from database dumps. The court rejected these search results because the studies lacked any analysis that would prove comparability.
Roche is important because Australia still follows the 1995 OECD Guidelines.
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The court arrives at the same conclusion about database dumps as the US courts came to 85 Id., at *24. 86 Id., at *24 (emphasis in original). 87 [2008] ATA 639. 88 Australia follows the OECD Guidelines more closely in cases involving a double tax treaty modeled on the OECD. Unlike the UK where the Guidelines are expressly adopted in the statutes, Australia follows the Guidelines because it is the "best evidence of international practice." The Federal Court of Australia recently observed (comparing the Australian and UK adherence to the Guidelines):
[T]he Sch 28AA regime [in the UK], by virtue of para 2 requires effect to be given to the Transfer Pricing Guidelines as they apply to treaties following the OECD model. The incorporation is not wholesale: it merely requires the schedule as a whole to be interpreted in such a way as secures consistency between para 1 of the schedule and the OECD model in accordance with the Transfer Pricing Guidelines. In determining an arm's length price appropriate adjustment must be made to reflect any material differences between the uncontrolled purchases and resales used as the basis for the calculation of the appropriate markup percentage and the resales of property involved in the controlled sale. The differences referred to in this subdivision are those differences in functions or circumstances which have a definite and reasonably ascertainable effect on price. 90 OECD, Guidelines (1995) at ¶ ¶1.15 & 1.16 (emphasis added).
To be comparable means that none of the differences (if any) between the situations being compared could materially affect the condition being examined in the methodology (e.g. price or margin), or that reasonably accurate adjustments can be made to eliminate the effect of any such differences. … In all cases adjustments must be made to account for differences between the controlled and uncontrolled situations that would significantly affect the price charged or return required by independent enterprises. Therefore, in no event can unadjusted industry average returns themselves establish arm's length conditions. 91 Treas. Reg. §1.481-1(d)(2) (emphasis added).
In order to be considered comparable to a controlled transaction, an uncontrolled transaction need not be identical to the controlled transaction, but must be sufficiently similar that it provides a reliable measure of an arm's length result. If there are material differences between the controlled and uncontrolled transactions, adjustments must be made if the effect of such differences on prices or profits can be ascertained with sufficient accuracy to improve the reliability of the results. For purposes of this section, a material difference is one that would materially affect the measure of an arm's length result under the method being applied. The Prescription Division is the most substantial division, marketing Roche prescription pharmaceuticals and performing limited research and development. The Consumer Division sells over-the-counter pharmaceuticals and the Diagnostic Division sells equipment and preparations used in hospitals and medical laboratories. The Diagnostic division had never been successful.
Most pharmaceutical products were obtained from Roche Holdings Limited in Basel, although some were obtained from the Roche Singapore subsidiary. Both tax treaties follow the OECD model. Article 9 in the Australian / Swiss and Article 6 in the Australian / Singapore double tax treaties are implicated in the case. The transfer pricing adjustments were also supported under applicable tax statute, specifically Division 13 of the ITAA 1936.
The Commissioner determined that the intercompany prices Roche Australia paid were not at arm's length. The prices were deemed excessive and that profits were being transferred from Australia through the pricing.
Decision
The court was persuaded that a reasonable gross margin for prescription pharmaceutical would be 40% and applied a resale price method with the same markup for all years in issue (1993 -2003) . The court reduced the assessment from approximately A$110 million to A$45 million. Only the Prescription Division was implicated in the appeal. The Commissioner's deficiency related to the Consumer and Diagnostic Divisions was not upheld. To be comparable means that none of the differences (if any) between the situations being compared could materially affect the condition being examined in the methodology (e.g. price or margin), or that reasonably accurate adjustments can be made to eliminate the effect of any such differences. … Where there are differences between the situations being compared that could materially affect the comparison, comparability adjustments must be made, where possible, to improve the reliability of the comparison. Therefore, in no event can unadjusted industry average returns themselves establish arm's length conditions.
The court rejected both parties transfer pricing arguments, although it found the Roche Australia economist, Dr. Daniel Frisch's submitted data while limited in scope to be persuasive. Dr. Frisch's report presented a CUP analysis based on internal comparable data he had access to for several pharmaceutical companies. The government was unaware on audit about this information. The ATO supported their assessment with experts Dr. Deloris Wright and Dr. Brian Becker. This paper focuses on the deficiency determination and the Roche database dumps defense, passing on other issues addressed in the case.
The Roche Deficiency -Multiple Database Dumps
The ATO engaged Dr. Wright as their expert witness to assist in developing the deficiency notice and defend their deficiency at trial. Altogether Dr. Wright conducted seven fairly comprehensive searches, in no case does the court indicate that she has presented it with anything more analytical than the search results themselves.
For the Prescription Division, Dr. Wright determined that a resale price method was most appropriate for the distribution and marketing functions while a cost-plus method was best for the clinical trial management and secondary manufacturing functions. A resale price method was also applied to the Consumer and Diagnostic Divisions.
It is important to put into context the database dumps involved in this case because the quantity of data involved has a role to play in the suggestion that the search itself can be substituted for comparability analysis. Roche Australia may well represent substituting "quantity for quality" that the OECD warns about. 93 Roughly speaking, the seven searches are summarized as follows:
(1) Prescription Division (a) Clinical trials -Three commercial databases are consulted yielding 591 companies from which 580 are discarded. 94 Eleven companies met Dr. Wright's criteria and five were added from other searches. 95 Fourteen of the remaining sixteen companies were UK firms. Markups for these firms ranged from 24.8% to (20.0%) with a 3.7% to 11.3% interquartile range and a 7.9% median. (b) Secondary manufacturing -In this search 1,440 companies were identified as potential comparables. From this potential pool, unspecified filters were applied to eliminate all but one remaining French firm and one Canadian firm. Because only the French firm had markup figures for the whole period, it became the exclusive referent to determine the interquartile range. Markups for these firms ranged 93 OECD Guidelines (2010) supra note 2, at ¶ ¶1.51 & 3.33. 94 The court notes, "She gave very few details of this process." Roche, [2008] ATA 639, at ¶65. 95 There is no indication as to what the criteria was that narrowed the search, other than these firms are "contract research organizations which specialize in the management of clinical trials, fruitless so Dr. Wright went to seventeen other countries that she felt were comparable to Australia and again she found no companies. 97 As a consequence, Dr. Wright segmented this function into its component parts: distribution, marketing, and selling: i. Distribution. Finding no independent pharmaceutical distributors in Australia, Dr. Wright went to the seventeen comparable countries and identified 1,080 companies. All but twenty-five were rejected for unspecified reasons and to this amount twentyfour were added from an unspecified prior search. An interquartile gross margin range was identified which after adjustments 98 yielded a gross margin range that was converted to operating margins (because a total cost plus method was being applied). The gross margin for these firms ranged from 14.3% to 6.8% with a 1.0% to 2.6% interquartile range with a 1.6% median 99 . ii. Marketing. This search involved eighteen countries including Australia. Dr. Wright found 265 companies, rejecting 258 leaving seven -six from the US and one from Canada. The search revealed a 2.9% to 23% markup range with a 9.0% to 15.9% interquartile range and a 13.1%.median iii. Selling. Dr. Wright's initial search this time found 1,069 companies, all located in the US. These companies provided various services to the pharmaceutical industry including outsourced sales services. There was apparently no further filtering for this group. The markup range was from (1.7%) to 16.5% with a 3.3% to 10.3% interquartile range and a 6.6% median. In this case Dr. Wright selected a markup at the top of the range "because I believe it to be the appropriate markup" without further analysis.
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96 Roche, [2008] ATA 639, at ¶69 (if so, the court observes, "… a very large markup can be found in a company operating at arm's length.") 97 The court notes that what Dr. Wright was looking for: she could not find companies which carried out functions sufficiently comparable to the activities of Roche Australia, partly because they did not carry out the detailing or direct marketing through medical practitioners. Roche, [2008] ATA 639, at ¶70. 98 Dr. Wright indicated that adjustments for: (a) carrying costs of inventory, (b) net accounts receivable, and (c) functional intensity were needed yet only the last adjustment (c) was made. For adjustments (a) and (b), Dr. Wright had no data to make them and did not do so. Dr. Wright indicated that these adjustments were "usually small" but in this case "could be quite large." Roche, [2008] ATA 639, at ¶73. 99 The gross margin range was 7.7% to 13.4% with a 7.2% to 9.2% interquartile range a 8.3% median. Roche, [2008] ATA 639, at ¶74. 100 Roche, [2008] ATA 639, at ¶77. Dr. Wright aggregated these Prescription Division search results to find a 43.2% to 45.8% arm's length gross margin range with a 44.4%.median.
(2) Consumer Division. Limited to only a division segment (Category 1 products) Dr. Wright searched for independent distributors involving fully finished unpatented products in Australia. She found none and for unspecified reasons resorted to the database search spanning seventeen comparable countries used in the distribution function under the Prescription Division. Unspecified adjustments were made to the search yielding 3.9% to 6.9% operating margins with a 5.6% median 101 .
(3) Diagnostics Division. Dr. Wright confronted similar problems with the Diagnostic Division as she did with the Consumer Division. Finding no comparables in Australia and nor in the seventeen other countries, she resorted to searching under the distribution function within the Prescription Division where Dr. Wright found 10 of the 49 pharmaceutical product distributors to be diagnostic product distributors. Once again, unspecified adjustments were made to the search yielding 4.5% to 9.0% operating margins with a 6.7% median 102 .
The court's response to database dumps The court was clearly frustrated with Dr. Wright's database dumps, confused by the methods Dr. Wright used and concerned that Dr. Wright's experience with American (as opposed to Australian) transfer pricing biases her conclusions. While Dr. Wright indicated that traditional methods were used, the court felt that fact profit methods were used. Also, Australian rules under the 1995 OECD Guidelines were not the same as the American rules in effect.
(1) Confusion in methods employed. The Court notes that Dr. Wright stated that she used traditional resale price or a cost-plus method 103 . The court declares that this is not what Dr. Wright does. "The method used by Dr. Wright is not really a transaction method but rather a profit method, with all their disadvantages"
104 .
The real concern should not be with the methods used 105 but whether or not Dr. Wright was dealing with comparables. There was no evidence as to Dr Wright's efforts to prove comparability with anything more analytical than the raw search data. In the end, no method can withstand scrutiny if it is not based on comparables and comparability must be demonstrated not simply asserted.
Some shifting among methods is acceptable as data is analyzed. As the OECD Guidelines state, "a transactional net margin method operates in a manner similar to the cost plus and resale price methods. This similarity means that in order to be applied reliably, the transactional net margin method must be applied in a manner consistent with the manner in which the resale price or cost plus method is applied" 106 . What does not shift among methods, however, is the requirement that analysis must be based in proven comparables.
A comparability analysis must be performed in all cases in order to select and apply the most appropriate transfer pricing method, and the process for selecting and applying a transactional net margin method should not be less reliable than for other methods. … As with the resale price and cost plus methods that the transactional net margin method resembles, this, however, does not mean that a mere similarity of functions between two enterprises will necessarily lead to reliable comparisons. … When the comparable uncontrolled transactions being used are those of an independent enterprise, a high degree of similarity is required in a number of aspects of the associated enterprise and the independent enterprise involved in the transactions in order for the controlled transactions to be comparable; there are various factors other than products and functions that can significantly influence net profit indicators 107 .
An example should make the Roche court problem much clearer. When Dr. Wright searched the Prescription Division's secondary manufacturing function for the markup percentage, Dr. Wright began her search with 1,440 potential comparables. Through an unspecified filtering process Dr. Wright eventually narrowed the pool to a single French company and concluded this is the comparable. If this is true, then we expect considerable firm-level analysis demonstrating comparability. We are looking for something like Dr. Chandler's four comparable companies analysis in the Westreco case. We are looking for analysis that looks carefully and comparatively at the five comparability factors: functions, risks, contractual terms, economic conditions, and property or service.
Dr. Wright, however, did not appear to compare Roche Australia's secondary manufacturing function with the French company as Dr. Chandler did. Instead, Dr. Wright simply holds up this single French company as the lone standard for determining the markup. The French firm became the standard because it was the "last man standing" after Dr. Wright applied her unspecified screens to the 1,440 potential comparables.
Responding to an American Bias
The court is well aware that Roche is the first Australian transfer pricing case, and that there is not a lot of litigation-tested transfer pricing economists in Australia. The court is also aware that the Australian statute 108 One of the points the court needed to hear arguments on was whether or not Dr. Wright's segmentation of Roche Australia's related party transactions was appropriate. Did the seven pricing studies represent distinct transactions or were these transactions so closely linked that they could not be examined separately?
111 Was this segmentation a prohibited adjustment to the controlled transaction under the Australia / Swiss and Australia / Singapore double tax agreements?
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Adjustments are normally made to the referent, aligning it with the controlled party. In this instance, however, Dr. Wright reversed the process, and made adjustments to the controlled party to align it with the referents. In determining whether this is this allowable, the court observes:
Although Dr Wright attempted to find companies whose activities were comparable to those of Roche Australia it must have been difficult to know precisely how much was outsourced in each case she selected and whether it was comparable to the work Roche Australia carried out. Segregation -the other aspect of adjusting comparables What the Roche court is concerned about could be seen as the converse of a comparability adjustment. Comparability adjustments are made to uncontrolled parties to align them with controlled parties. Segmentation is just the reverse. Segmentation is the process whereby certain transactions of controlled parties are isolated so that they can be compared more precisely with transactions that have been identified between uncontrolled parties.
Under both US and OECD rules it is appropriate to conduct separate and aggregate arm's length price tests. Aggregation is appropriate if taken as a whole, the transactions are so interrelated that the transactions together are the most reliable means to determine the arm's length price. 114 It is not appropriate to pull discrete transactions from a group of interdependent transactions if the separation removes business elements that have a definite and material effect on prices.
Dr. Wright segments Roche Australia into at least seven parts. She does this to align discrete parts of Roche Australia with results from her database searches. What she does not do is justify the segmentation. Because the court does not know why she performs this segmentation, it rejects her database searches outright. Even though the segmentation may indeed be appropriate, the court needs to be told "why" this is the case. The court is not told. In particular, the court needs to know that the segmentation does not remove from the comparison critical elements of the Roche Australia business processes that have a material impact on prices. The court is not assured that this has not happened. The court has been presented with a database dump, no more, no less.
The Roche court's concern is echoed in a recent Canadian transfer pricing case, GlaxoSmithKline v. The Queen. 115 Once again in Glaxo we are concerned with a global pharmaceutical company that has a controlled subsidiary marketing prescription pharmaceuticals locally. The Roche / Glaxo comparison is very apt because Canada, like Australia, is following the 1995 OECD Guidelines 116 . The concern in Glaxo is that the government appears to be inappropriately segmenting the purchase of prescription medication ingredients from the related license that allows the company to manufacture and sell the finished product. Glaxo Group Ltd., a UK based multinational pharmaceutical company that also sells and manufactures pharmaceuticals globally. Glaxo Canada is the Canadian subsidiary that secured the Canadian rights to manufacture and sell Zantac, an ulcer medication in a license agreement with its UK parent. In a separate agreement Glaxo Canada purchased ranitidine, the active ingredient in Zantac, from another related Swiss based company (Adechsa S.A.).
Glaxo Canada paid a 6% royalty for the Canadian manufacturing and selling rights. It paid between CAD 1,512 and CAD 1,635 per kilogram for ranitidine. The Canadian Revenue Authority (CRA) adjusted the price Glaxo Canada paid for ranitidine, ignoring the royalty arrangement.
The Deficiency
The CRA presented evidence that generic drug manufacturers in Canada purchased chemically identical ranitidine for market prices between CAD 194 and CAD 304 per kilogram throughout the assessment period. These independent firms were able to manufacture and sell a generic drug that was medically identical to Zantac. The CRA argued that the prices these companies paid for ranitidine were comparable uncontrolled prices.
The Tax Court upheld the CRA assessment based on a CUP methodology. The court applied the highest per-kilogram price GlaxoSmithKline's competitors paid for ranitidine to the volumes Glaxo Canada Purchased. The difference (less a $25 per kilogram adjustment for the finer GlaxoSmithKline ranitidine granulation) was allocated to Glaxo Canada as unreported profits. The Tax Court followed the CRA's lead and disregarded the license agreement.
On appeal, the Federal Court of Appeal found that the Tax Court had erred in its arm's length price determination for ranitidine, because the license agreement had a material effect on the price paid for ranitidine. The Appeals Court indicated that the Tax Court failed to consider a crucial business circumstance. The question is not: "What is the fair market value of ranitidine?" 117 The question is: "What would a reasonable person in the same business circumstances as Glaxo Canada be willing to pay for ranitidine?" It would be pointless for Glaxo Canada to purchase ranitidine from Adechsa without a license to manufacture and sell Zantac. A third party buyer, however, might be willing to pay a premium for Adechsa ranitidine if doing so would allow it to manufacture and sell a trademarked pharmaceutical drug (Zantac) that commands a significant price premium over competing generic drugs.
118 This is what the Tax Court should have considered and the Appeals Court remanded the case back to the Tax Court to make such a determination based on these facts. This is an instance where two transactions must be considered in the aggregate. The license cannot be segregated from the ranitidine purchase.
In reaching its decision, the Canadian Federal Appeals Court found support in the Australian Appeals Tribunal reasoning within the Roche decision. In the Appeals Court decision, an internal comparable was identified that was applied to the prescription pharmaceuticals Roche Australia imported. The Australian Tax Commissioner objected that the prices Roche Australia paid were too high. The court, however, pointed out that the foreign parent needed to be compensated not only for the tangible product but also for the related intellectual property. These two transactions needed to be aggregated.
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Conclusion
If searches for comparables in commercial databases are becoming the norm in transfer pricing 120 and there is a growing tendency to substitute the search itself for sound comparability analysis (the database dump), 121 then what is the likely result if on audit or through litigation all of a taxpayer's proposed comparables are rejected? DSG Retail v. HMRC, the final case considered in this paper, indicates that we will probably end up with a profit split in an OECD jurisdiction. with what should be done when all proposed comparables fail because adequate adjustments cannot be (or are not) made.
Background
The DSG group constitutes the largest electronics retail chain in the UK. Outlets include Dixons, Currys, and PC World. DSG offers customers extended warranties at check-out and for a fee consumers can purchase an extension to the manufacturer's warranty.
In-store DSG personnel function as agents for a third-party insurer, Cornhill Insurance plc (Cornhill), that is based in the Isle of Man 123 . Cornhill was not, however, prepared to hold more than 5% of the risk on an insurance contract 124 so Cornhill purchased reinsurance for the other 95%. In all cases the reinsurer was another DSG company, Dixons Insurance Services Limited (DISL), a wholly owned DSG subsidiary resident in the Isle of Man 125 .
Thus, Cornhill effectively ceded 95% of the proceeds from extended warranty contracts back to the DSG group through DISL. DISL and Cornhill were both exempt from income tax in the Isle of Man.
Assessing comparables DISL's non-existent bargaining power continually troubled the Special Commission, especially when it only had three real employees. 126 Any potential comparable that could not explain how DISL achieved exceptional returns with three employees performing routine activities and minimal bargaining power was rejected.
DSG offered the court six CUPs and a TNMM. All seven proposals were rejected because adjustments could not be made to the uncontrolled parties to account for material differences. Bargaining power was the critical difference. HMRC argued and the court agreed that because all the comparables were inadequate, a profit split must be used. The Special Commission did not reduce the proposed comparables reliability as would be suggested under the US regulations. Instead it rejected the comparables as suggested under the OECD Guidelines. The court aggregated all profits and then distributed among the parties (DSG, Cornhill, and DISL) in accordance with their relative capital contributions.
" [T] he basic idea of a return on the required capital is the same as Mr. Gayford's [HMRC's expert] which in our view takes more relevant factors into account." The 123 Cornhill Insurance plc in the DSG fact pattern performs the same role as the Fronting Company set up by Fireman's Fund Insurance Company in the UPS fact pattern. 124 The court reports a "conflict in evidence" on this point. Some evidence points to the fact that Cornhill was not willing to accept more than 5% of the risk, other evidence point to the fact that 5% is the minimum standard fee for a "fronting insurer" to take. Special Commission underscores that by moving to a profit split. The Special Commission is therefore, in fact and in substance, following the OECD Guidelines. 127 Mr. Gayford's method was in accordance with the OECD Guidelines. In terms of the Guidelines we consider that Mr. Gayford is using a profit split method based on total profit with a mixture of contribution analysis and residual analysis approach. … It is a mixture of the contribution analysis and the residual analysis in that no first stage return is allocated to DSG, which makes sense here since because of their bargaining position … all the residual profit will be allocated to [DSG] … The only factor used by Mr. Gayford which is not in accordance with the Guidelines was that he used hindsight. 128 Other DSG-type outcomes are likely One of the key differences in the approach to comparability between the current US regulations 129 and 1995 and 2010 OECD Guidelines 130 is what happens if adjustments are not made for material differences. This difference is important, and it is likely to be encountered by MNEs.
The likely situation is where one jurisdiction (an OECD jurisdiction) rejects a transfer pricing study based on a database dump, and another jurisdiction (a jurisdiction agreeing with the US approach) finds the comparables proposed in the database dump to be acceptable, but with reduced reliability.
While all situations are unique, a rough road map for where this scenario might arise can be inferred from comparative studies involving global APA programs. Most APA programs release data on the transfer pricing methods used in successful agreements. Because commercial databases are used most heavily with the CPM and TNMM methods, it would stand to reason that a jurisdiction that resisted CPMs and TNMMs in the APA process would be a jurisdiction that was inclined to reject rather than work with database dumps.
For example, a recent comparative APA study indicated that the TNMM comprised 93% of the South Korean, 131 59% of the Australian, 132 53% of the Italian, 133 but only 39% of the Canadian APAs. 134 In the US, the Cost Plus and Profit Split methods taken in aggregate represent 65% of the APAs dealing with tangible and intangible
